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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
— - O O O O O O O — 
JUNE TRAPP, S Case NO. 900485 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
Priority No. 14(b) 
v. : 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, : 
Defendant/Appellee• : 
000O000 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred on the Court by 
Utah Code Anno. §78-2-2(3) (j) (1989). 
The pertinent proceedings below include only Salt Lake City 
Corporations ("Salt Lake City") Motion for Summary Judgment, 
argued before the Honorable Richard H. Moffat on August 31, 1990. 
On September 25, 1990, Judge Moffat entered his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, as well as his Order of Dismissal 
with Prejudice granting Salt Lake Cityfs Motion for Summary 
Judgment.l 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue presented for review is whether the trial court 
erred in holding that Salt Lake City did not owe June Trapp 
*Order of Dismissal with Prejudice dated September 25, 1990 
(R. 72-73). 
("Mrs. Trapp") a duty to maintain the sidewalk in question in a 
reasonably safe condition. 
Inasmuch as this challenge to a summary judgment presents for 
review conclusions of law only, the Court reviews those conclusions 
for correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions.2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a personal injury action filed by Mrs. Trapp for 
injuries sustained by her on May 11, 1988 when she fell over a 
defective portion of a Salt Lake City sidewalk. Mrs, Trapp's 
Complaint alleged that Salt Lake City was negligent in failing to 
maintain the sidewalk and in failing to warn pedestrians of the 
defective section of the sidewalk. 
Salt Lake City filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on June 
19, 1990. In its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Salt Lake City relied upon Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 
P.2d 149 (Utah 1989), for the proposition that it owed no duty to 
Mrs. Trapp to maintain the sidewalk because Mrs. Trapp could show 
no special relationship between the parties. 
Salt Lake City's Motion contained other arguments, but the 
trial court granted Salt Lake Cityfs Motion solely on the basis of 
2Daniels v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., Ill P.2d 1100 
(Utah App. 1989). 
2 
its public duty doctrine argument. The trial court entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order, and its Order of 
Dismissal with Prejudice on September 25, 1990. 
Mrs. Trapp filed her Notice of Appeal on October 5, 1990. On 
November 5, 1990, Mrs. Trapp filed her Motion for Summary 
Disposition seeking summary reversal of the trial court's Order on 
the basis of manifest error. 
On November 16, 1990, Salt Lake City filed its Cross Motion 
for Summary Disposition seeking summary affirmance of the trial 
court's decision. 
On or about December 21, 1990, this Court issued a written 
decision granting Mrs. Trapp1s Motion for Summary Reversal and 
denying Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary Affirmance. The 
Court's decision instructed the trial court to vacate the judgment 
of dismissal and reinstate the case for trial on the merits. 
On or about December 31, 1990, Salt Lake City filed its 
Petition for Reconsideration of Summary Disposition. After 
receiving memoranda from both parties, this Court granted Salt Lake 
City's Petition for Reconsideration on or about February 6, 1991. 
The written decision vacated the summary reversal order and 
reinstated the appeal for plenary disposition. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 11, 1988, Mrs. Trapp was walking eastward on the north 
side of 300 South Street, between State and Main Streets in Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Mrs. Trapp stepped into a hole in the sidewalk 
left by broken and missing decorative bricks. As she fell forward, 
she tried to break her fall but was unable to prevent striking her 
face on the sidewalk. The fall resulted in several broken teeth, 
facial lacerations, and an injury to Mrs. Trapp's right hand. 
Because of the limited legal basis for the trial court's 
decision, no other facts are relevant to the issues presented for 
review. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it held that Salt Lake City owed 
Mrs. Trapp no duty to maintain its sidewalks. Salt Lake City's 
duty to maintain its sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition was 
established as a matter of law as early as 1926. 
Salt Lake City's duty to Mrs. Trapp was not extinguished by 
the holding in Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989). 
The so-called "public duty doctrine" as expressed in Ferree has 
been recognized in Utah for at least twenty years. The sidewalk 
maintenance cases upon which Mrs. Trapp relies have coexisted with 
the precedent supporting Ferree since at least 1971. Thus, the 
4 
trial court's reliance on Ferree to conclude that Salt Lake City 
owed no duty absent a special relationship was error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT'S HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO DUTY TO 
MAINTAIN SIDEWALKS ABSENT A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IS ERROR. 
Salt Lake City's Motion for Summary Judgment, as granted by 
the trial court, focused on only one element of Mrs. Trapp's 
negligence claim: duty. Salt Lake City argued that because Mrs. 
Trapp could not establish a special duty owed to her by Salt Lake 
City, as distinguished from a duty owed to the general public, her 
negligence claim must fail under the public duty doctrine as 
expressed in Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989). 
In response, Mrs. Trapp acknowledged that she had no special 
relationship with Salt Lake City that might create a duty distinct 
from that owed to other members of the public. Instead, Mrs. Trapp 
relied on a long line of cases in support of her argument that Salt 
Lake City's duty to maintain its sidewalks is established as a 
matter of law. The "sidewalk maintenance" cases establish Salt 
Lake Cityfs duty to each individual member of the public. 
In Rollow v. Ogden City, 66 Utah 475, 243 P. 791 (1926), this 
Court held that a municipality is charged with a nondelegable duty 
to exercise due care in maintaining sidewalks within its corporate 
limits in a reasonably safe condition: 
5 
"It is...well settled that in maintaining the public 
streets and highways within the limits of such cities and 
towns a positive legal duty is imposed to maintain them 
in a reasonably safe condition for travel. In other 
words, cities and towns are required to exercise 
reasonable care and diligence in maintaining the public 
streets and highways within their corporate limits in a 
reasonably safe condition for travel, and that in case 
any injury and damage results to anyone lawfully using 
such streets or highways for travel, which injury and 
damage arise by reason of the negligence of such city or 
town in not maintaining such streets or highways in a 
reasonably safe condition for travel, such city or town 
is liable to the injured person for the damages sustained 
by reason of the negligence aforesaid...." (emphasis 
added). 
Rollow, 243 P. at 794-5. 
The only aspect of Rollow that distinguishes it from the 
present matter, that it involved travel over a street rather than 
a sidewalk, is meaningless. There is nothing unique about the 
nature of a street that gives rise to a duty to maintain it as 
opposed to a sidewalk. Rather, the duty arises in both cases from 
the city's ownership of the structures and the fact that it has 
assumed responsibility for maintaining the structures.3 
Citing Rollow and Nyman v. Cedar City, 361 P.2d 1114 (Utah 
1961) , this Court again held that a city is charged with the 
3This Court recognized the lack of any meaningful difference 
between a street and sidewalk in this context in Murray v. Ogden 
City, 548 P.2d 896, 897 (Utah 1976), when it noted that Ogden 
City's sidewalks are considered a part of its public streets. In 
discussing the duty issue, this Court combined streets and 
sidewalks in one category: "a city is charged with the nondelegable 
duty to exercise due care in maintaining streets and sidewalks 
within their corporate limits in a reasonably safe condition for 
travel." 548 P.2d at 897. 
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The city has a nondelegable duty to exercise due care in 
maintaining streets and sidewalks within its corporate 
boundaries in a reasonably safe condition for travel and 
may be held liable for injuries proximately resulting 
from its failure to do so. (Citations omitted) 
733 P.2d at 127. 
Implicit in the holding of Ingram v. Salt Lake City and the 
other sidewalk maintenance precedents is recognition of the fact 
that the duty to maintain a public sidewalk, by its very nature, is 
a duty owed to everyone who uses the sidewalk. By definition it is 
a public duty.4 Ingram and its predecessors establish the duty as 
a matter of law because if Plaintiffs are required to show a 
special relationship to prove a duty in sidewalk maintenance cases, 
a municipality can never be held negligent for failure to maintain 
a sidewalk. There is simply no conceivable set of circumstances 
under which a member of the general public, such as Mrs. Trapp, can 
show the requisite special relationship. Thus, the trial court 
erred in holding that Mrs. Trapp's negligence claim must fail 
absent a special relationship. 
POINT II; THE DUTY TO MAINTAIN SIDEWALKS IS AN EXCEPTION TO THE 
PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINE. 
Contrary to Salt Lake Cityfs arguments, Ferree v» State of 
Utah did not announce a new rule of law impliedly overruling the 
4|fStreets from side to side, including the sidewalks and all 
area between, are primarily for the public use. The public use is 
paramount." Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126, 127 (Utah 
1987). 
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citizens. The Trial Court erred in failing to recognize the 
exception. 
CONCLUSION 
Although it is true as a general matter that municipalities 
owe no duty of care to their citizens absent a special 
relationship, the duty to maintain sidewalks is an exception. Utah 
courts have long recognized a nondelegable duty on the part of 
municipalities to maintain their sidewalks in a reasonably safe 
condition. The trial court1s conclusion that Mrs. Trapp's claim 
fails absent a showing of a special relationship was, therefore, 
error. 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order of dismissal 
with prejudice and reinstate the matter for trial on the merits. 
DATED: . 1991. 
Craig G. Adamson 
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